贝淡宁:贤能政治是个好东西(Political Meritocracy Is a Good Thing : The Case of China)

作者 贝淡宁   翻译吴万伟  2012年9月1日财经网

贤能政治的含义是设计一种政治制度,挑选能力超过平均水平的政治领袖做知情的、道德上站得住脚的政治决断。也就是说,贤能政治有两个关键因素:(1)政治领袖有超过平均水平的才能和品德;(2)设计用来选拔这种领袖的机制
当今世界,贤能政治已在政治理论中黯然失色,但是,在中国背景下,复兴并重新解释这种政治理念尚有三个重要理由。其一、贤能政治过去是,也会一直是中国政治文化的核心;其二、西方民主是一种有缺陷的政治体制,而贤能政治有助于弥补其部分缺陷;其三、过去三十多年里,中国共产党本身正变得越来越崇尚贤能。本文接下来将讨论一下这几个方面,最后会提出一些问题供大家思考。

   1、贤能政治和中国政治文化   贤能政治是中国政治文化中的一个重要主题。“尚贤使能”的理念是春秋时期贵族等级解体的产物1战国时期大多数著名的思想家也认同此观点,针对如何定义“贤能”,如何开展政治活动、确立以“贤能”为基础的制度,政治思想家们展开了激烈的辩论。孔子认为,贤能政治始于有教无类的观念。然而,在此过程中不是人人都有同等的能力做出知情的、道德上站得住脚的政治决断。因此,政治体制的一个重要任务就是选拔能力在平均水平之上的领导去做知情的、道德上站得住脚的政治决断,并鼓励更多有才学的人参政。孔子认为,这样的统治者才会赢得人民的信任。   在皇权时代的中国,贤能政治依靠科举制使优胜者取得功名与权力的途径制度化。无论该体制有何缺陷,它确实提供了选拔贤才的最低标准,并带来了适度社会流动。科举制度传播至韩国、越南,同时影响了西方国家公务员考试的发展。二战后,东亚国家的快速发展,至少有一部分原因应归结为按照贤能标准选出的政治统治者所做出的周全决策。目前,政治调查显示,受儒家传统影响的东亚各国普遍支持贤能政治的理念。在中国,史天健吕杰认为大多数人认可“监护人话语(guardianship discourse)”而不认可自由民主话语(liberal democratic discourse),前者认为有必要选出“关心人民需求、决策时考虑人民利益、代表人民和社会选择好的政策的高水平政治家”,后者则强调可以确保人民参与政治、选择领导人的权利的程序性安排2   贤能政治的理念也是西方政治理论和实践的核心。柏拉图在《理想国》中为贤能政治理念辩护的著名言论是:“最好的政治制度中,政治领导人因有卓越的能力做出知情的、在道德上站得住脚的政治决断而被选出,并被授权统治这一共同体。”在接下来的历史中,贤能政治也有相当的影响力,尽管后来的思想家几乎很少为纯粹的贤能政治辩护。美国的开国元勋以及19世纪的“自由精英”如密尔(John Stuart Mill)和托克维尔(Alexis de Tocqueville)都提出了试着将贤能政治和民主政治结合在一起的政治主张。不过,将贤能政治理论化的努力已经全部从西方政治话语中消失了。虽然探讨民主理论与实践的书籍千千万万,但人们很难找出最近有任何一本论述贤能政治的英文著作。   2. 民主政治与贤能政治   如果自由民主政治被广泛赞同是最好的政治制度(或者像温斯顿·丘吉尔的名言那样,是一种最不坏的政治制度),缺乏贤能政治的辩论或许没有问题。但是,民主制遭遇的质疑越来越多。商品、服务和资本史无前例地全球流动造成了西方民主国家的“治理危机”,这一点很多政治学家都有所记述。[1]政治理论学家已经对投票制度本身提出质疑。部分原因是选民往往只自私地关心自身狭隘的物质利益,而忽视了子孙后代和居住在国家边界之外人的利益。詹森·伯南(Jason Brennan)曾说,如果选民无法做出知情的、道德上站得住脚的政治决断,不如不去投票的好。[2]·卡普兰(Bryan Caplan)通过广泛的实证研究显示,选民常常是非理性的,他建议对选民的参政能力进行检测以作为矫正措施。3当然,这样的建议在自由民主社会是注定行不通的。一人一票形式体现出来的政治平等原则在当今具有接近神圣不可侵犯的地位。在19世纪,密尔还能提出让受教育者获得额外选票的建议,但是如今支持这种建议的人可能被认为(在西方国家)已经丧失了道德指南。当然,也存在如下的问题,投票时若只是追求狭隘的利己主义经济利益,就会给缺乏代表的非选民带来灾难性的后果(如全球变暖)。同样值得担忧的是,或许选民也经常弄不清楚自己的利益所在。布莱恩在政治过程中,资本家利益集团掌握了过多的权力,尤其在美国政治体制下,一人一票被说成一美元一票看来并不冤枉。   幸运的是,中国的政治理论家并没有这么教条。儒学家蒋庆认为,民主的合法性——在西方根植于人民主权论——应该受到来自天和地的合法性的平衡。他认为,在现代背景下,这种政治理想应该通过三院制国会来实现,其中权威在庶民院、通儒院和国体院之间分配,三者代表了三种形式的合法性。4类似的,复旦大学教授白彤东和香港大学教授陈祖为提倡把民主政治和贤能政治因素结合起来的混合政治体制模式,其中,贤士院的政治领袖通过考试以及在政府基层工作的政绩选拔产生(我也赞成混合体制,由贤能之人组成的议院被称为贤士院)。这些模式可能有点乌托邦色彩,但他们提供了新的——这或许存在争议——更好的标准来评估中国以及其他地方的政治进步。不是以中国是否变得更为民主来判断政治进步,新标准提供了判断政治进步(或退步)的更为全面的方式。关键是中国政治制度是否变得更为尚贤。这里或许有令人乐观的理由。   3. 贤能政治与中国共产党   毛泽东时代的中国共产党明确拒绝儒家倡导的贤能政治。这也许可以理解,因为当时的主要任务是鼓动革命,增强军事力量以便终结外国列强的压迫和欺凌。但现在,中国共产党领导建立了相对安全和强大的中国,这意味这中国可以较少地担心政治共同体的生存问题。因此,任务的重心转移到由德才兼备的政治领袖进行善政的问题,中国共产党的选拔和晋升机制因此变得更为尚贤。   20世纪80年代,中国一流大学里的优秀学生往往不会寻求加入中国共产党。现在,情况不同了。高校校园成为招募工作的主阵地。12010年,在清华这样的精英学校,全部本科生中的28%,大四毕业生中的43%,以及硕士毕业生中的近55%是共产党员。2(我在清华教书近8年,我最优秀的学生几乎全部是共产党员)。中国共产党同时还瞄准了城市地区“新兴社会阶层”中的年轻专业人员,包括商人、私企经理、律师和会计。   干部晋升体制的尚贤色彩更为明显。在最近与几位中外学者的对话中,中共中央组织部部长李源潮先生讲述了一些有趣又很说明问题的细节。李部长提到,对于不同政府层别,会使用不同标准判断其能力和品德。在基层,与人民的紧密关系尤其重要(换句话说,或许民主在基层更为重要)。在更高层,更多地强调理性,因为领导需要综合考虑多种因素,制定决策时涉及治理的更广泛的内容,但例如关心群众、实事求是的态度也很重要。干部还应以身作则树立廉洁的榜样。为了说明政府高层干部选拔的严格(尚贤)性,李部长介绍了中共中央组织部秘书长的选拔过程。首先是包括退休干部在内的提名过程。获得较多提名的候选人将进入下一个环节。接下来是考试,试题包括如何当好秘书长。十几个人参加考试,之后有5位入选下一轮。为确保过程公平,考试答卷要被张贴到走廊供所有人判断。之后是口试,考官专家组由部长、副部长和大学教授担任。为确保透明和公开,为秘书长工作的一般干部可以旁听,他们可以监督整个过程。之后,人事部门将组成一个检查组,考察各位候选人的政绩和品德,品德的表现更为重要。这一轮中选出两位进入下一阶段。最终的当选者将由一个由12位部长组成的委员会投票产生,至少需要获得8票。如果首次投票没有人获得8票,部长们将做进一步讨论,直到三分之二的评委就当选者达成一致。   中共中央组织部秘书长如此严格的选拔过程确实令人印象深刻(成功当选者更令人敬佩)。人才选拔过程的这种透明有助于增强政府的合法性。如果人民不清楚选拔过程,他们就会怀疑这种选拔主要是由于忠诚、关系或腐败。透露一些具体选拔机制,就会消除上述疑虑。当然,还有很长的路要走,比如对影响中央委员会成员或者政治局成员选拔的标准的更多信息就非常有用,不过,李源朝部长向我们介绍组织部的选拔过程这件事本身就是一个风向标,意味着选拔过程将更趋于透明,这是一个好现象。   4. 改进贤能政治   中国共产党“实际存在”的尚贤好处很明显。干部要经过极其严格的人才选拔过程,只有那些过去政绩优异的人才可能上升到政府的最高层。培训过程包括对品德的培养,如在贫困乡村地区工作一定时间,培养诸如对弱势群体的同情等品德。此外,这种尚贤的选拔过程只有在一党制国家里才有用。在多党制国家中,因为政府主要官员可能由于不同政党的领导而发生更迭,因此不能确保政府基层官员因为政绩突出而得到提拔,政党也就没有强烈动机去培训干部,让他们在政府高层工作时更富有经验,。因此,即使是像美国总统奥巴马这样的有才能的领导人,一旦上任可能也会犯很多“初学者的错误”,因为他们没有接受过为迎接在政府最高层工作而应有的适当的历练。1中国领导人由于经验和历练的关系,不太可能犯这样的错误。最高层由委员会(政治局9名常委)集体决策也排除了因无知无畏而做出错误决策的可能性(如李光耀在新加坡推行的受教育妇女的生育得到照顾的政策,其理论基础是多数科学家反对的优生学)。 
   中国领导人上任后,他们可以做出关系到所有利害关系人利益的决定,包括子孙后代和居住在国外的人。在多党制民主国家,领导人通常通过竞争性选举获任,与前面情况相反,领导人需要考虑下届选举,他们很可能出于短期政治考虑做出决策,增加连任机会。像后代子孙这样的非选民利益如果与现任选民利益冲突,很有可能不会被认真对待。   此外,在西方式民主中,真正的掌权者是在选举中由人民选出的人,这个事实往往意味着“官僚”不重要;因此,相对平庸者会进入官僚体制。这一缺陷在美国政治体制中尤为明显。从最近我与一位年轻的罗德奖学金(也许是美国教育体制中最有声望的奖学金,目的是选拔未来领导)获得者的谈话中可以略见一二。她对国际事务感兴趣,我建议她或许可以进入美国国务院,但是她回答说,有人警告她,美国国务院中多是平庸之辈,真正有才能的人很难在那样的体制中脱颖而出。相反,中国政治体制并没有明确地区分“官僚”和“掌权者”,因此有志向的能人并不会怯于加入这个政治体制的基层,因为他们有希望向高层晋升。   不过,这里并非暗示美国和其他国家应该努力学习中国式的贤能政治。一方面,它只存在于推崇贤能政治的稳定政治文化之中:像上面提到的,政治调查显示受儒家传统影响的东亚国家更倾向于重视贤能政治。但在其他的文化中可能并非如此。例如,美国政治文化形成了一股强烈的“反精英”思潮,因此很难想象它会支持尚贤的一党制。但这并不是说认美国政治体制中没有精英主义元素(例如,最近美国总统都是哈佛和耶鲁的毕业生),但政治领导人往往不愿意公开表现出精英主义的特点。更重要的是,很难想象美国的政治体制会做出鼓励贤能政治的重大宪法改革。(有可能会预见到更糟糕的变化——例如在美国本土遭到另一起重大恐怖袭击时会变得更为军国主义)。与此相反,中国宪法体制在必要的情况下更有可能经历重大变革。 
   笔者也没有暗示中国“现实存在的贤能政治”尽善尽美。中国贤能政治的成功非常明显:中国领导人创造了历史上最引人注目的成就,数亿人摆脱贫困走上富裕路。但是,同样明显的是,中国的有些问题如腐败、贫富差距、环境破坏、政府官员的权力滥用、过分强大的国有企业为了自身的利益扭曲经济体制、迫害政治异议分子、严厉镇压西藏和新疆的宗教表达等是在政治体制变得更加尚贤的同时出现的。这部分是因为中国各级政府缺乏民主,毕竟,民主可以提供权力制衡也给边缘化的群体表达政治意愿的机会。但是,部分也是因为中国的贤能政治还没有得到充分的发展。该体制在过去30年逐渐尚贤使能,未来能够也应该更为尚贤。   贤能政治涉及到德才兼备的政治官员的选拔,请允许笔者依次论述。过去30年中共最明显的进步就是强调对能力与政绩优异的官员的挑选和提拔,尤其是在政府高层,但是,即使在这方面也仍然有改进的空间。不妨考虑一下“反精英心态”对言论自由特别是政治言论自由的限制。最好的政治决策当然必须建立在充分的信息基础之上,但是如果一味担心负面结果可能会阻碍相关各方自由表达观点。笔者发现中国共产党开始进行内部调研,以尽可能充分地获取信息,干部们也被鼓励不断学习和提高,但言论自由障碍的减少可能会提高决策的质量。   另一个担忧是过分严格的、历时多年的人才选拔过程是否会阻碍冒险精神。换句话说,相对有创造力和原创性思维的人才可能会在早期被淘汰,因为他们会得罪人或挑战“做事的正常套路”。在危机时刻,或许中国的政治制度能做出巨大变革,但在平时,过于强调保持现状可能会影响制度的实用性。也许这个问题(如果这是个问题的话)有解决的办法,比如在政府重要岗位(包括政治局)上多设置一两个岗位,允许其他出身的能人如商人或学者来担任。 
   选拔过程或许有必要对国外更加公开。中国共产党的主要任务当然是服务中国人民。但中国现在是国际大国,其内部事务会同样影响到居住在中国边境以外的人的利益,在与其他国家打交道的时候,中国需要尽可能人性化。政府领导人子女在海外接受教育是一个好现象,因为他们可以当非正式顾问,不过,什么也替代不了领导人直接接触外国的做事方式。在选拔政府高层领导人的过程中,或许也应该重视海外经验,甚至是外语技能。阎学通认为中国政府应该像唐朝那样聘用有才华的外国人当官。1 
   同样重要的是,政府最高层需要有更多少数民族成员的代表,即使他们并非能完全从现有政治体制中脱颖而出。只有真诚的宗教信徒才真正知道什么对其宗教的发展最好,而贤能政治的决策需要宗教共同体成员的更多代表。一种可能性就是在政治局中保留少数民族群体的代表。蒋庆提议的国体院就是由中国历史上各种宗教的领袖所组成,包括儒教、藏传佛教、道家和基督教。 
   当然,贤能政治决策不仅仅是拥有能力和知识进行政治决策的问题。拥有高超分析技能和专业知识的不道德的决策者可能比一个平庸无能的政治领袖造成的危害更大。笔者并没有暗示中国政治领袖不道德。我遇见过很多令人敬佩的官员,他们有为公众服务的精神,为了公众利益甚至不惜牺牲自身的利益。但是,有道德的领导人不应该容忍腐败的猖獗,当今中国人都知道政治腐败是个严重的问题。中国领袖的任期和年龄限制有助于减少腐败,但是还需要其他机制的配合,比如相对独立的反腐败机构(类似于香港和新加坡的廉政公署)、更多的透明、媒体报道腐败案的自由、领导人及其家庭成员的财务审计、领导人工资提高、对腐败分子的严厉惩罚等。   更多强调政治领袖的道德教育也很重要。现有的领导选拔过程不允许领导者有足够地时间对道德问题和政治问题进行系统性的反思。在党校的几周并不能让领导者有充分时间阅读政治学、历史和哲学名著,进而增加领导者的知识,做出知情的、道德上站得住脚的政治决断。如果给政治领袖半年的假期,专门去阅读名著(特别是直接论述政治道德的儒家经典),从长期看,会增加其做出知情的、道德上站得住脚的政治决断的能力。同样重要的是,在中小学更多强调儒家经典可能改善未来中国领袖的道德教育水平。   当然,政治决策者不仅仅应该克制自己不腐败。无论是对民众,还是动物和自然界,他都应该有仁爱之心。但是,这种渴望与政治决策群体尤其是决策高层中的女性代表的极度缺乏很难匹配。当今的领导选拔过程中存在着对女性的偏见。由于女性经常需要照顾其他家庭成员,她们可能没有充足的时间公平地与其他男性竞争政府最高职位。(即使女性不是主要的家庭关照者,这种期待也影响选拔过程:有人告诉我女性很难进入外交部工作,因为这些职务的要求很难与普通家庭生活协调起来)。如果我们同意领导应该有同情心,那么上面这点就很重要。如果同情心是女性突出的一种特质(也许这个说法有争议),那么我们应该鼓励更多女性在政府任职。也许政府最高层职位中应该有一半为女性保留。我坚信更多女性领袖组成的政府更可能用充满爱心和人道的方式统治。 
   显然,走向“贤能政治”的过程是长期的转变过程,没有明显的终点(和通常意味着国家最高领导人的自由和公正的竞争性选举的民主化过程不认同)。但是一个明显的前进之路是中国共产党更改名称,以便更加符合该组织的机构性现实及其理想。最明显的是,该组织已经不再是共产主义者,很少中国人,包括中共党员相信中共在带领中国人迈向更高阶段的共产主义。无论是马克思还是毛泽东都不重视贤能政治。列宁的先锋队理念也与此不同。再者,共产党也不像其他政党。共产党是代表整个国家不同群体和阶级的多元化组织,在一定程度上,也代表世界。更准确的名字也许是“中国贤能联盟”。 
   笔者最后想说的话可能在具有民主传统的国家引起激烈的争议。中国可以从民主政权的一些典型政治美德中学到很多东西如政治参与、自由、透明、宽容等。但是中国的政治制度能够和应该建立在贤能政治现有和潜在的优势基础之上。政治官员被赋予政治决策权力长达几十年的训练,在决策时有能力考虑子孙后代、世界其他地方人和自然界的利益,即使该决策可能与大多数公民的利益发生冲突,再加上委员会决策而不是给予个体(比如美国总统)最终的决定权。贤能政治的所有这些优势与更多的自由、透明、宽容、非全国性政府的政治参与和最高层一定程度的政治竞争是相容的。但是贤能政治与高层的多党竞争不相容,也与一人一票选举最高决策者不相容。因此,中国的任务不是学习当今许多民主派认为的民主制的这个核心内容,而是改善贤能政治,学习民主制的其他方面。 
 作者简介: 贝淡宁(Daniel A. Bell),上海交通大学志远讲座教授和清华大学(北京)政治理论教授,比较政治哲学研究中心主任,与范瑞平合编以蒋庆为主要作者的《儒家宪政秩序:中国古代如何能影响其政治未来》(普林斯顿大学出版社2012年)一书。    译者感谢作者贝淡宁教授提出的修改建议----译注
1尤里·派恩斯(Yuri Pines),《永恒的帝国》,普林斯顿大学出版社2012年第3章   2 《文化对人民理解民主的影响》, 2010年华盛顿特区美国心理分析协会(APSA)年会。   [1] 例如,查尔斯·库普乾(Charles Kupchan),《民主的隐忧》,《外交事务》,2012年1月/2月刊。   [2] 《投票的道德》普林斯顿大学出版社,2011。   3 《理性选民的神话》普林斯顿大学出版社,2007年。   4 《儒家宪政秩序》普林斯顿大学出版社,2012年。   1郭钢,《中国大学生入党》,《当代中国》,2005年5月,第14期,第43页。   2 www.china.org.cn/china/2011-05/31/content_22678122.htm   1 http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/print/2012/03/obama-explained/8874/   1 阎学通,《古代中国思想,现代中国力量》普林斯顿出版社2011。

Political Meritocracy Is a Good Thing (Part 1): The Case of China


Political meritocracy is the idea that a political system is designed with the aim of selecting political leaders with above average ability to make morally informed political judgments. That is, political meritocracy has two key components: (1) the political leaders have above average ability and virtue; and (2) the selection mechanism is designed to choose such leaders.
Political meritocracy has been largely eclipsed from political theorizing in the modern world, but there are three important reasons for reviving and reinterpreting this political ideal, particularly in a Chinese context. First, political meritocracy has been, and continues to be, central to Chinese political culture. Second, democracy is a flawed political system and meritocracy can help to remedy some of its flaws. Third, the Chinese Communist Party itself has become a more meritocratic organization over the last three decades or so. I will discuss each of these factors in turn.
Political meritocracy is a key theme in the history of Chinese political culture. The idea of "elevating the worthy" emerged in the wake of the disintegration of the pedigree-based aristocratic order of the Spring and Autumn period. This idea was shared by the vast majority of known thinkers in the Warring States period, and political thinkers debated about how to define merit and how to develop political practices and institutions based on merit. For Confucius, political meritocracy starts from the assumption that everybody should be educated. However, not everybody will emerge from this process with an equal ability to make morally informed political judgments. Hence, an important task of the political system is to select leaders with an above average ability to make morally informed political judgments, as well as to encourage as many people of talent as possible to participate in politics. Such rulers, in Confucius' view, would gain the trust of the people.
In Imperial China, political meritocracy was institutionalized by means of the imperial examination system that put successful candidates on the road to fame and power. Whatever the flaws of the system, it did provide a minimal standard of talent selection and allowed for a modest level of social circulation. The examination system spread to Korea and Vietnam and also influenced the development of civil service examinations in Western countries. In the post World War II era, East Asian societies developed rapidly at least partly due to the sound decision-making of meritocratically-selected political rulers.
Today, political surveys show that there is widespread support for the ideal of political meritocracy in East Asian societies with a Confucian heritage. In China, Shi Tianjian and Lu Jie show that the majority of people endorse "guardianship discourse," defined as the need to identify "high quality politicians who care about the people's demands, take people's interests into consideration when making decisions, and choose good policies on behalf of their people and society" over liberal democratic discourse that privileges procedural arrangements ensuring people's rights to participate in politics and choose their leaders.
The idea of political meritocracy is also central to Western political theory and practice. Plato famously defended a meritocratic political ideal in The Republic: the best political regime is composed of political leaders selected on the basis of their superior ability to make morally informed political judgments and granted power to rule over the community. Meritocracy was influential throughout subsequent history, though subsequent thinkers rarely defended a pure form of political meritocracy. U.S. founding fathers and 19th century "liberal elitists" such as John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville put forward political ideas that tried to combine meritocracy and democracy. Yet theorizing about meritocracy has all but faded from modern Western political discourse. There are hundreds if not thousands of books on the theory and practice of democracy, but it is hard to think of a single recent (and decent) English-language book on the idea of political meritocracy.
The dearth of debates about political meritocracy would not be problematic if it were widely agreed that liberal democracy is the best political system (or the least bad political system, as Winston Churchill famously put it). But there are growing doubts. The "crisis of governability" in Western democracies caused by the unprecedented globalized flow of goods, services, and capital has been well documented by political scientists. Capitalist interests have disproportionate power in the political process, especially in the American political system which has been described, perhaps not unfairly, as one-dollar one-vote rather than one-person one-vote.
Political theorists have raised questions about the voting system itself. Part of the problem is that voters are often selfishly concerned with their narrow material interest, and ignore the interests of future generations and people living outside national boundaries who are affected by the policies of the government. Jason Brennan has argued that voters should stay away from the voting booth if they cannot make morally informed political judgments. Certainly there are some issues where the pursuit of narrow economic self-interest at the voting booth could lead to disastrous consequences for non-voters who lack representation (consider global warming). Just as worrisome, perhaps, voters often misunderstand their own interests. Drawing on extensive empirical research, Bryan Caplan shows that voters are often irrational and he suggests tests of voter competence as a remedy. Of course, such proposals are non-starters in liberal democracies. The principle of political equality expressed in the form of one person, one vote has assumed quasi-sacred status today. In the nineteenth-century, John Stuart Mill could propose extra votes for educated people, but today proponents of such proposals are considered (in Western countries) to have lost their moral compass.
Fortunately, political theorists are not so dogmatic in the Chinese context. Jiang Qing has argued that democratic forms of legitimacy -- which in the West is grounded in notions of popular sovereignty -- should be balanced by two other sources of legitimacy that come from Heaven and Earth. In a modern context, he argues that this political ideal should be institutionalized by means of a tri-cameral legislature, with authority divided between a House of the People, a House of Confucian Scholars, and a House of Cultural Continuity that correspond to the three forms of legitimacy. Similarly,Bai Tongdong and Joseph Chan have argued for models for a hybrid political regime that combines elements of democracy and meritocracy, with meritocratic houses of government composed of political leaders chosen by such means as examination and performance at lower levels of government (I have also argued for a hybrid regime, with a meritocratic house of government termed the House of Exemplary Persons).
These models may be utopian, but they provide us with a new, and, arguably, better standard for evaluating political progress in China and elsewhere. Instead of judging political progress simply by asking whether China is becoming more democratic, the new standard provides a more comprehensive way of judging political progress (and regress). The question is also whether the Chinese political system is becoming more meritocratic. And here there may be grounds for optimism.
In its early days, Communist China under Mao explicitly rejected Confucian-inspired ideas of political meritocracy. Understandably, perhaps, the main task was rewarding revolutionary energy and securing military strength for the state to put an end to abuse and bullying by foreign powers. But now, the establishment of a relatively secure and strong Chinese state under the leadership of the CCP means that China has less to worry about survival qua political community. Hence, the emphasis has shifted to the task of good governance led by able and virtuous political leaders, and the selection and promotion mechanisms of the CCP have become more meritocratic.
In the 1980s, talented students at leading Chinese universities often did not seek to join the CCP. Today, it's a different story. College campuses have become the main location for recruitment efforts. At elite schools like Tsinghua University, 28 percent of all undergrads, 43 percent of Graduating seniors and up to 55 percent of grad students were CCP members in 2010 (I've been teaching at Tsinghua for nearly eight years, and many of my high-performing students are party members). The CCP is also targeting the "new social stratum" of young professionals in urban areas, including business people and managers in private firms, lawyers, and accountants.
The promotion system for cadres is even more explicitly meritocratic. At a recent dialogue session with several foreign and Chinese academics, Mr. Li Yuanchao, Minister of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, provided some fascinating and illuminating details. Minister Li noted that different criteria are used to judge abilities and virtues at different levels of government. At lower levels, close connection with the people is particular important (put differently, perhaps, democracy is more important at the lower levels). At the higher levels, more emphasis is placed on rationality since cadres need to take into account of multiple factors and decision-making involves a much broader area of governance, but virtues such as concern for the people and a practical attitude also matter. Cadres are also expected to set a model of corruption-free rule.
To illustrate the rigorous (meritocratic) nature of selection at higher levels of government, Minister Li described the procedure used to select the secretary general of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee. First, there was a nomination process, including retired cadres. Those who received many nominations could move to the next stage. Next, there was an examination, including such questions as how to be a good Secretary General. Over 10 people took the exam, and the list was narrowed to five people. To ensure that the process was fair, the examination papers were put in the corridor for all to judge the results. Then, there was an oral examination with an interview panel composed of ministers, vice-ministers, and university professors. To ensure transparency and fairness, ordinary cadres who work for the General Secretary were in the room, which allowed them to supervise the whole process. Three candidates with the highest score were selected for the next stage. Then, the department of personnel led an inspection team to look into the performance and virtue of the candidates, with more emphasis placed on virtue. Two people were recommended for the next stage. The final decision was made by a committee of 12 ministers who each had a vote, and the candidate had to have at least eight votes to succeed. If the required number of votes was not secured the first time, the ministers discussed further until two-thirds could agree on a candidate.
It is hard not be impressed by the rigorous selection process for the secretary general of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee (and it is even harder not to be impressed by the successful candidate). Such transparency in the talent selection process is likely to contribute to the government's legitimacy. If people are not aware of the selection process, they may suspect that promotion is based primarily on loyalty, connections (guanxi), or corruption. Hence, shedding light on the actual mechanisms is likely to dispel such suspicions. There is still a long way to go -- for example, it would be useful to have more information about the criteria that influence selection of members on the Central Committee and the Politburo -- but the fact that Minister Li told us about the process in his organization is a good sign of a high-level decision to increase transparency.
No system is perfect, of course, and my next post will suggest some ways of improving political meritocracy in China.
A version of this post first appeared in the Christian Science Monitor.

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